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Abstract 
By exploring a genealogy of the ideas of human rights and sovereignty, I will attempt to 
shed light on the problems of nation-state, its violence and its power. 
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要旨 
人権と主権の観念の系譜を探究することで、国民国家とその暴力、その権力の
問題を明らかにする。 
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The second half of the twentieth century is described as the Age of Rights. However, we 
should recognize the description reflects not only the fact that human rights have 
successfully flourished through the latter part of the twentieth century, but also the fact 
that human rights were terribly neglected to the extent that the Rights of Man became 
completely ineffective during the first half of the twentieth century. Considering this 
historical fact, we can see the twentieth century was an “age of extremes”, as Eric 
Hobsbawm called it. I will explore the problematic theme of human rights and 
sovereignty, or the relation of human rights to sovereignty and sovereignty to human 
rights, in-between the two extremes of care and neglect of human rights. The nature of 
sovereign power has undergone a very profound transformation since the Rights of Man 
was declared and, at the same time, regarded as the basis for state sovereignty in the 
eighteenth century. As to this transformation, Michel Foucault puts “the ancient right to 
take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of 
death” (Foucault 1990: 138). He argues the transformation of sovereign power makes 
massacres possible in twentieth century wars. In discussion of human rights and 
sovereignty, we should not disregard his suggestion, for, I believe it holds the key to 
understanding the enigma of sovereignty.  
 
In the present day, human rights are expressed as “individual sovereignty”, for many 
scholars consider that the concept of human rights limits state sovereignty. If that is the 
case, however, what is, or what should be, individual sovereignty or present-day human 
rights? What is, or what should be, the relation between state sovereignty and individual 
sovereignty? While asking these questions regarding the two perspectives of sovereignty, 
we should be cautious in how we refer to the theories of social contract, because social 
contract theories do nothing but legitimatize the relation between individual sovereignty 
and state sovereignty and tend not to make it problematic. So, temporarily, we need to 
analyze human rights and sovereignty separately. 
 
The perplexities of human rights  
 
We use the same word of ‘human rights’ both when we talk about human rights as the 
basis of a sovereign state, and when we engage in humanitarian assistance or dispense 
charity. The former concept of human rights is required in the process of forming a 
constitutional government. On the other hand, the latter must be distributed to those 
who are struggling to subsist, facing famine, or are in danger of death. The supposed 
recipient of human rights in the former context represents right holders in a given decent 
society or state. Whereas in the latter case, the supposed recipient presents life at its 
most basic. Actually we think life as such has a dignity which we cannot harm because 
of its sacredness. However, are the two usages of human rights valid?   
 
Putting aside the attempts to determine philosophically the foundation of human rights, 
they are, in terms of pragmatism, ostensibly self-evident, for we understand that 
individuals are granted human rights simply because they are of the human species. 
However, just taking a look around the world, human rights generally come with an 
intrinsic un-obviousness. Refugee or asylum seekers, people facing famine and victims 
of indiscriminate bombing, may well raise skepticism about the effective enforcement 
of their human rights. The two usages of human rights as mentioned above exemplify 
the puzzle of human rights in the real world. Hannah Arendt had already pointed out 
 
this problem as being “the perplexities of the rights of man”, which has been widely and 
repeatedly cited: 
 
The Rights of Man, after all, have been defined as “inalienable” because they 
were supposed to be independent of all governments; but it turned out, that 
the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back 
upon their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no 
institution was willing to guarantee them (Arendt 1976: 291-292).  
 
To understand the paradox, we shall first discuss the self-evidence or truism of human 
rights then we shall explore where the “perplexities” originate.  
 
What is human dignity? 
 
The truism of human rights could derive from the obviousness of the word “human dignity” 
which implies a mixed ethic, legal and political sense. “Human” in human dignity signifies 
that human dignity is based on an ability which animals are not granted. Namely it is 
language. The following passages from The Politics of Aristotle are well known. 
 
…man alone of the animal possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, can 
indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals, as 
well (for their nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of what 
is painful and pleasant and to signify those sensations to one another), but 
speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and 
therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in 
distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and 
bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in 
these things that makes a household and a city-state (Aristotle 1932: 11).  
  
Language ability gives human beings, as against other living animals, the additional 
capacity for a political existence. This ability causes a proper and unique desire in 
human beings and the society in which they live. Primarily because of language, human 
beings have the ability to understand and recognize precepts between people and within 
societies or communities. Those precepts are required for people to live together in 
accordance with order and peace. If people develop the ability adequately and exercise 
it effectively, people can guide their own behavior by themselves properly. The desire 
inherent in human beings is that man wants others to recognize his ability to guide and 
adjust himself to get along well with others in a community. The desire enables man to 
create and build mutual trust within a community, which removes mutual distrust and 
makes the community stable. Human dignity which is qualified as some inviolable 
power arises when and where people mutually recognize the above ability, and people’s 
respect for dignity enables a society or a community to reproduce itself. The circulation 
of the desire for recognition, creation of mutual trust and reproduction of community 
might well endow human dignity with a sacred power.  
 
I do not know of any great human civilization or city-state that does not include respect 
for dignity and accountability for the individuals it rules. So, the truism of human 
dignity is derived from the fact that human beings are born among people and grow up 
among people which conditions human beings to adapt to the environment.  
 
However, this still does not suffice to understand the seeming truism of human dignity 
in its modern meaning. So we need to look at another ability of human beings: reason. 
By virtue of reason, people can understand the Laws of Nature which tell us what are 
the Natural Rights endowed to man by nature. Now let me move forward to the Age of 
Enlightenment. It seems appropriate to refer to Locke’s Two Treatises of Government.  
 
Human dignity in the age of enlightenment 
 
Locke used his concept of state of nature “[t]o understand Political Power right, and 
derive it from its Original” (Locke 1988: 269). Following Locke, this state is also a state 
where everyone is equal one among another without subordination or subjection. 
Moreover this should be a “State of Liberty” but it is not a “State of license”.  
 
[T]hough Man in that State has an uncontrollable Liberty, to dispose of his 
Person or Possessions, yet he has not Liberty to destroy himself, or so much 
as any Creature in his Possession, but where some nobler use, than its bare 
Preservation calls for it. The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, 
which obliges every one: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, 
who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to 
harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions (ibid.: 270-271).  
 
In order to sustain stable life, health, liberty and equality within a community and to 
rule the community, by preventing infringement on natural law and punishing those who 
infringe on the rights of man, people form political bodies or civil societies and have a 
government with political power. Led by reason, these processes of social contract 
develop. Reason is also considered to be embedded within each individual. So we 
regard reason as a sacred gift which we understand endows man with dignity.    
 
We can confirm, in the declarations of the eighteenth-century, Locke’s conception of 
rights or the Enlightenment notion of human rights, which leads to the present-day 
notion of human dignity: “That all men are by nature equally free and independent and 
have certain inherent rights” (Virginia Declaration of Rights); “We hold these truths to 
be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness” (The Declaration of Independence); “Men are born and remain free and 
equal in rights” (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen). 
 
Thus, in the Age of Enlightenment, human dignity came to be understood as given by 
“nature” itself. However, since then, some social, political roles or activities, which 
were crucial to human dignity in earlier times, were to play a less important part in the 
notion of human dignity. It seems that after the eighteenth century declarations, while 
human rights came to be established in the constitutions of modern states, the concept of 
political existence of men became diluted. For, in modern nation states which are 
granted authority by being based on human rights, subjection of an individual to 
sovereign power is valid with the sole purpose of effectively protecting his life. Thus we 
can see there was some change in the notion of human dignity in the course of the 
eighteenth century, when the concept of Natural Rights turned into the present-day 
concept of human rights. Now, human dignity means respect for mere life as such and 
dignity is an indispensable part of human rights. This picture of human rights, I assume, 
could explain the truism. 
 
Now, human rights are given the name of individual sovereignty. This notion of sovereignty 
seems very different from the notion of state sovereignty though, the two concepts of 
sovereignty have mutual, intimate interrelation in the theories which justify the authority of 
nation state within a given state and international humanitarian intervention. So the research 
I intend to undertake is to analyze the concept of sovereignty.  
 
The themes for furthering my research are as follows: 
 
 1. What is the notion of ancient sovereignty? 
 2. What is the notion of state sovereignty? 
 3. What is the notion of individual sovereignty? 
 4. The genealogy of the above three notions. 
 5. To understand the relation of the above three notions genealogically. 
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